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THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 
Matthew Diller* & Alexander A. Reinert** 
INTRODUCTION 
The Second Circuit is renowned for its landmark rulings in fields such as 
white collar crime and securities law—bread and butter issues growing out 
of Wall Street’s preeminence in the financial landscape of the nation.  At 
the same time, the Second Circuit has a long tradition of breaking new 
ground on issues of social justice.  Unlike some circuit courts which have 
reputations in the area of social justice built around one or two fields, such 
as the Fifth Circuit’s pioneering role in civil rights litigation1 or the Ninth 
Circuit’s focus on immigration,2 there is no one area of social justice 
litigation that could be considered the Second Circuit’s signature issue.  
Instead, it has issued key decisions and established important lines of cases 
in a wide range of subjects. 
Moreover the Second Circuit has developed these bodies of law, for the 
most part, in its own distinctive incremental manner.  The circuit has long 
operated through consensus, with little of the Sturm und Drang that have 
accompanied en banc reviews and fiery dissents that are common in some 
other courts of appeals.3  Indeed, the Second Circuit’s tradition and practice 
of disfavoring en banc review in favor of awaiting guidance from the U.S. 
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debt he owes to the late Honorable Walter R. Mansfield for whom he clerked in the 1985–86 
term of the Second Circuit and whose mentorship has played a critical role in his career. 
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 1. “The Fifth Circuit’s Four” were comprised of four legendary judges in the 1950s and 
1960s who played a major role in ending Jim Crow in the South. See generally JACK BASS, 
UNLIKELY HEROES (1981). 
 2. See ANNA O. LAW, THE IMMIGRATION BATTLE IN AMERICAN COURTS 144–87 (2010) 
(studying the Ninth Circuit’s role in the immigration system). 
 3. See Mario Lucero, Note, The Second Circuit’s En Banc Crisis, 2013 CARDOZO L. 
REV. DE NOVO 32, 36–42, http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/denovo/LUCERO_ 
2013_32.pdf (noting that between 2000 and 2010, the Second Circuit heard eight cases en 
banc, about half the number heard by the next highest circuit) [https://perma.cc/VV7E-
UYZ9]. 
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Supreme Court has long been a matter of interest to commentators and 
courts alike.4 
The Second Circuit’s strong tradition in social justice litigation is, in part, 
a reflection of the richness of the legal community in the New York City 
metropolitan area and the vibrancy of urban life in the geographic 
boundaries of the circuit.5  New York City is the home of many major 
national public interest organizations, including the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU), the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Legal 
Momentum (formerly NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund), vibrant 
local organizations focused on civil rights and legal services for low-
income clients, and small public interest law firms focused on civil rights 
and allied litigation.  These public interest organizations draw on the rich 
community of the nineteen law schools within the circuit and are 
supplemented by the robust pro bono traditions of the major law firms.  In 
addition, federal, state, and local government law offices in the circuit have 
a well-established tradition of affirmative litigation. 
This Article highlights just a few areas of law as illustrations of the 
Second Circuit’s jurisprudence in dealing with claims of marginalized and 
subordinated individuals and groups.  In the area of civil rights, this Article 
focuses on sexual harassment law and prisoners’ rights.  In the area of 
public benefits, this Article focuses on public assistance and the disability 
benefit programs of the Social Security Act.  The discussion of public 
assistance will focus on one blockbuster case, Goldberg v. Kelly.6  These 
are just some examples of the circuit’s social justice jurisprudence that has 
developed over several decades. 
Any attempt to account for the Second Circuit’s jurisprudence in social 
justice in just a short essay will, of necessity, be vastly incomplete.  For 
instance, while this Article focuses on more recent opinions, there are some 
earlier Second Circuit opinions in the areas of immigration,7 due process,8 
 
 4. See id.; see also Wilfred Feinberg, Unique Customs and Practices of the Second 
Circuit, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 297, 311–12 (1986); James Oakes, Personal Reflections on 
Learned Hand and the Second Circuit, 47 STAN. L. REV. 387, 392–93 (1995). Compare 
Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 88, 92–93 (2d Cir. 2008) (Jacobs, C.J., dissenting) (dissenting 
from the denial of rehearing en banc and criticizing reliance on the court’s “tradition” of 
denying en banc review), with id. at 89–90 (Katzmann, J., concurring) (“Throughout our 
history, we have proceeded to a full hearing en banc only in rare and exceptional 
circumstances.”). 
 5. This observation is not intended to denigrate the outstanding social justice oriented 
law practices in Connecticut and Vermont, as well as elsewhere in New York State. 
 6. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 7. See Soo Hoo Yee v. United States, 3 F.2d 592, 597 (2d Cir. 1924) (recognizing that 
a Chinese person born in the United States “well understood the difficulty he would 
encounter in establishing his right to enter the country” and therefore excusing his entry to 
the United States in a manner indicating a “desire to escape the observation of the inspection 
officers with whom he thought he might have trouble”); United States ex rel. Haum Pon v. 
Sisson, 230 F. 974, 976 (2d Cir. 1916) (rejecting the claim that an individual should be 
deported to China simply because of his appearance, and noting that “[i]n the present 
age . . . it is impossible to tell by the mere inspection of a man where he was born or from 
whence he came”). 
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and civil rights9 that undoubtedly made their mark at the time.  And even 
though this Article concentrates on cases from the mid- to late twentieth 
century to the present, we lack both the space and the time to expound on 
significant recent decisions in the areas of national security,10 disability 
rights,11 children’s rights,12 and discrimination on the basis of race13 or 
sexuality,14 among others.  Additionally, outside of its decisions, the court 
has taken other significant steps in areas such as immigration.15  We lack 
 
 8. See United States ex rel. Jelic v. Dist. Dir. of Immigration & Naturalization, 106 
F.2d 14, 19 (2d Cir. 1939) (finding that the examining inspector at an immigration hearing 
failed to provide a fair hearing to a noncitizen seeking admission to the United States); 
Angelus v. Sullivan, 246 F. 54, 62–64 (2d Cir. 1917) (holding that habeas corpus may issue 
to a local conscription board where an individual claiming exemption from military service 
has been denied a full and fair hearing). 
 9. See Fitzgerald v. Pan Am. World Airways, 229 F.2d 499, 501–02 (2d Cir. 1956) 
(finding that section 484(b) of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 implicitly created a cause 
of action for racial discrimination against passengers by airlines); United States ex rel. Lynn 
v. Downer, 140 F.2d 397, 401–03 (2d Cir. 1944) (Clark, J., dissenting) (arguing that separate 
selective service quotas for African American and white men were inconsistent with 
statutory law and equal protection doctrine). 
 10. See, e.g., Turkmen v. Hasty, 789 F.3d 218, 237 (2d Cir. 2015) (en banc) 
(recognizing the availability of a Bivens action for post-September 11 detainees); ACLU v. 
Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 821 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that the National Security Agency’s 
collection of telephone metadata exceeded authority granted by the Federal Intelligence 
Surveillance Act); John Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861, 882–83 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding 
that provisions regarding National Security Letters violated the First Amendment). 
 11. See, e.g., Disabled in Action v. Bd. of Elections of N.Y., 752 F.3d 189, 199–200 (2d 
Cir. 2014) (holding that the Board of Elections denied meaningful access to its voting 
program to people with vision and mobility disabilities); Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 
F.3d 261, 290 (2d Cir. 2003) (upholding injunctive relief against New York City for 
residents with acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) or HIV-related illnesses); 
Soc’y for Good Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1250 (2d Cir. 
1984) (finding that an individual with mental retardation has due process right to “training 
sufficient to prevent basic self-care skills from deteriorating” in order to maintain liberty 
interest in a decent and humane existence). 
 12. See, e.g., Doe v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 709 F.2d 782, 790 (2d Cir. 1983) 
(establishing substantive due process duty of care for children in foster care); Rivera v. 
Marcus, 696 F.2d 1016, 1024–25 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that a relative licensed as a foster 
parent has protected liberty interest in the integrity of her family). 
 13. The circuit’s housing discrimination jurisprudence, for example, looms large. See, 
e.g., Ragin v. N.Y. Times, 923 F.2d 995, 1000 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that the exclusive use 
of white models in real estate advertisements can violate the Fair Housing Act); Huntington 
Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 933 (2d Cir.) (holding that litigation 
under the Fair Housing Act is subject to disparate impact analysis), aff’d, 488 U.S. 15 
(1988); United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1103 (2d Cir. 1988) (rejecting 
the use of racial quotas in housing as a means of maintaining racial balance); United States 
v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181, 1184 (2d Cir. 1987) (affirming a finding of 
intentional discrimination in housing and education); see also Glenn W. Falk, Housing 
Discrimination Law, 14 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 593, 593 (1994) (outlining “the list of powerful 
Second Circuit opinions analyzing far-reaching claims of racial segregation in housing”). 
 14. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 184–85 (2d Cir. 2012) (applying heightened 
scrutiny to classifications based on sexuality), aff’d on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 2675 
(2013). 
 15. For instance, with Chief Judge Robert Katzmann’s encouragement and assistance, 
law firms, nonprofit organizations, immigration groups, bar associations, law schools, and 
federal, state, and local governments have focused attention on access to counsel for 
immigrants in the service of fair and effective administration of justice in immigration 
proceedings. See generally Robert A. Katzmann, Innovative Approaches to Immigrant 
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the space to address here the depth of the Second Circuit’s impact in these 
and many other areas of importance to social justice movements.  The areas 
we highlight, however, reflect the Second Circuit’s considered and nuanced 
approach to the difficult questions that courts encounter every day in these 
areas.  We hope that in so doing, we have given a picture, albeit incomplete, 
that does justice to the Second Circuit’s tradition and history. 
I.  THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S LEADING ROLE 
IN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 
New York City has long been home to some of the leading nonprofit 
organizations active in antidiscrimination challenges, including the NAACP 
Legal Defense Fund, the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, 
Lambda Legal, Legal Momentum, and the ACLU, not to mention small 
public interest law firms that regularly litigate employment discrimination 
and civil rights claims.  Although many of these groups litigate across the 
country, they also have brought challenges to policies and practices of local 
public and private institutions.16  Thus, it should be no surprise that 
significant opinions in the area of antidiscrimination law emerged from the 
Second Circuit. 
This part focuses on the Second Circuit’s sexual harassment 
jurisprudence.  As a general matter, discrimination is a function of power 
dynamics that are pervasive throughout social institutions, including 
courts.17  The problem of sexual harassment in the workplace is just one 
 
Representation:  Exploring New Partnerships, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 331 (2011); Robert A. 
Katzmann, Deepening the Legal Profession’s Pro Bono Commitment to the Immigrant Poor, 
78 FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (2009); Kirk Semple, Seeking Better Legal Help for Immigrants, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/29/nyregion/service-program-
will-recruit-law-school-graduates-to-help-represent-immigrants.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/ 
ZPP4-BYVD]. 
 16. See, e.g., United States v. City of New York, 359 F.3d 83, 97 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding 
that public welfare recipients obliged to participate in New York City’s Work Experience 
Program are employees within the meaning of Title VII and are entitled to Title VII’s 
protections against sexual and racial harassment); Comer v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 775, 784–85 
(2d Cir. 1994) (discussing plaintiffs’ class action alleging racial discrimination and 
segregation in public housing and assistance programs in Erie County, New York); Ragin v. 
Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co., 6 F.3d 898, 902–03 (2d Cir. 1993) (discussing plaintiffs’ 
complaint alleging discriminatory advertising in violation of the Fair Housing Act); 
Waisome v. Port Auth., 999 F.2d 711, 712 (2d Cir. 1993) (discussing the claim in a 
consolidated class action that the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey’s promotional 
examinations had disparate impacts on black officers in violation of Title VII); Wilder v. 
Bernstein, 848 F.2d 1338, 1341 (2d Cir. 1988) (addressing the claim that New York City’s 
statutory scheme for provision of child care services violated the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Constitution); Hispanic Soc’y of N.Y.C. Police Dep’t Inc. v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 806 
F.2d 1147, 1150–51 (2d Cir. 1986) (involving a challenge to the sergeants’ examination 
administered by the New York City Police Department), aff’d sub nom. Marino v. Ortiz, 484 
U.S. 301 (1988); Arthur v. Nyquist, 573 F.2d 134, 136 (2d Cir. 1978) (addressing an 
allegation of intentional segregation by the Buffalo school system); Vulcan Soc’y of N.Y.C. 
Fire Dep’t, Inc. v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 490 F.2d 387, 390 (2d Cir. 1973) (involving 
a challenge to the employment practices of the New York City Fire Department). 
 17. See Elise C. Boddie, Adaptive Discrimination, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1235, 1240–41 
(2016) (presenting the theory that racial discrimination is a complex, adaptive system that 
persists through “ostensibly race-neutral institutional rules, laws, and behaviors”); Susan K. 
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example.18  As Joanna Grossman has suggested, sexual harassment law has 
developed over three eras:  (1) the emergence of consciousness in the 
1970s; (2) the development of a theoretical and doctrinal understanding of 
harassment as discrimination in the 1980s and 1990s; and (3) the more 
recent critiques from those who claim that the law now regulates too much 
interpersonal conduct, as well as those who claim that the law insufficiently 
deters or compensates for the harms of harassment.19  As this Article 
discusses, the Second Circuit played a significant role in this evolution, and, 
although this Article highlights only a few of the most important cases, the 
Second Circuit overall has embraced a nuanced understanding of 
discrimination in the workplace that goes above and beyond sexual 
harassment. 
While abuse and harassment of a sexual nature has existed for centuries, 
the recognition that such harassment could be actionable at law did not 
emerge until after 1964 with the passage of Title VII.20  Initially, courts did 
not appreciate that workplace sexual harassment could constitute 
discrimination in employment on the basis of sex.  For example, according 
to one judge in the District of Arizona, pervasive harassment was simply “a 
personal proclivity, peculiarity or mannerism” in which the supervisor “was 
satisfying a personal urge.”21  A judge in the District of New Jersey adopted 
this same logic in the 1976 case of Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & 
Gas Co.,22 in which an employee alleged that her supervisor had invited her 
to lunch, made “sexual advances,” and ultimately demoted and fired her 
after she had complained about the incident.23  For judges like these, 
 
Hippensteele, Revisiting the Promise of Mediation for Employment Discrimination Claims, 9 
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 211, 221–23 (2009) (describing the inability of traditional dispute 
resolution mechanisms to adequately redress employment discrimination); Susan Sturm, 
Second Generation Employment Discrimination:  A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. 
REV. 458, 460 (2001) (characterizing “second generation” discrimination as involving 
“social practices,” “patterns of interaction,” and “[s]tructures of decisionmaking, 
opportunity, and power”). 
 18. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics:  Toward a 
Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 93 
(2003) (“[W]e can have little hope of transforming existing power differentials without an 
adequate conceptualization of the modern forms of discrimination that is independent from, 
though naturally coexistent with, prevailing conceptions of workplace discrimination.”); 
Linda S. Greene, Sexual Harassment Law and the First Amendment, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
729, 740 (1995) (discussing the presence of group power dynamics in sexual harassment); 
Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2172 (2003) (contextualizing 
sexual harassment in “larger structures of gender inequality in which genuine sex harassment 
flourishes”). 
 19. Joanna L. Grossman, Moving Forward, Looking Back:  A Retrospective on Sexual 
Harassment Law, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1029, 1030–31 (2015). 
 20. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 253 (codified in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 21. Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated, 562 
F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).  On July 19, 2016, Professor Reinert, a coauthor of this Article, had 
a conversation with Heather Sigworth, the plaintiff’s attorney in Corne, in which he learned 
that the case was settled after remand. 
 22. 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976), rev’d, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977). 
 23. Id. at 557. 
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applying Title VII to such conduct was “ludicrous” and would force 
employers to only hire people “who were asexual.”24 
Judicial reluctance to apply Title VII to sexual harassment in the 
workplace operated on four levels.  On one level, resistance was based on a 
narrative about the fundamental urges of sex.  As the judge from the 
District of New Jersey put it in Tomkins, Title VII was not meant to 
“provide a federal tort remedy for what amounts to physical attack 
motivated by sexual desire on the part of a supervisor and which happened 
to occur in a corporate corridor rather than a back alley.”25  In other words, 
courts reasoned that because the law could not be shoehorned to intervene 
in “natural” social relations, the fact that the behavior occurs in an 
employment context should not place it under the umbrella of Title VII.  On 
another level, resistance flowed from a misreading of what constituted 
discrimination on the basis of sex.  Early on, courts reasoned that because 
the gender of each person is “incidental to the claim of abuse,” it cannot be 
discrimination on account of sex, but simply an encounter in which “sexual 
desire animated the parties, or at least one of them.”26  Third, reluctance 
rested on various concerns about a flood of new claims that could be raised 
under Title VII:  (1) that coworkers who claim that they were disfavored as 
a result of a woman “accepting” sexual advances by a supervisor might 
bring suit alleging discrimination and (2) that sexual harassment itself is so 
common that too many claims would be filed if Title VII was viewed as 
covering harassment.27  Finally, resistance also stemmed from a desire to 
avoid disrupting social conventions: 
“The attraction of males to females and females to males is a natural sex 
phenomenon and it is probable that this attraction plays at least a subtle 
part in most personnel decisions.”  This natural sexual attraction can be 
subtle.  If the plaintiff’s view were to prevail, no superior could, 
prudently, attempt to open a social dialogue with any subordinate of either 
sex.  An invitation to dinner could become an invitation to a federal 
lawsuit if a once harmonious relationship turned sour at some later time.28 
Courts within the Second Circuit were not immune to this kind of 
thinking.  A District of Connecticut judge cited Tomkins for the proposition 
that a female employee could not establish a Title VII violation where she 
 
 24. Corne, 390 F. Supp. at 163–64. 
 25. Tomkins, 422 F. Supp. at 556. 
 26. Id.  Even in reversing the district court’s decision in Tomkins, the Third Circuit 
crafted a dividing line between “complaints alleging sexual advances of an individual or 
personal nature and those alleging direct employment consequences flowing from the 
advances, finding Title VII violations in the latter category.” Tomkins, 568 F.2d at 1048. 
 27. See Tomkins, 422 F. Supp. at 556–57 (“The abuse of authority by supervisors of 
either sex for personal purposes is an unhappy and recurrent feature of our social 
experience. . . .  And if an inebriated approach by a supervisor to a subordinate at the office 
Christmas party could form the basis of a federal lawsuit for sex discrimination if a 
promotion or a raise is later denied to the subordinate, we would need 4,000 federal trial 
judges instead of some 400.”). 
 28. Id. at 557 (quoting Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233, 236 (N.D. Cal. 1976)). 
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complained that a male employee had “once pinched her breast and on 
another occasion invited her to bed.”29 
The Second Circuit, however, soon demonstrated an appropriate level of 
sensitivity to similar allegations.  For example, in the 1989 case Carrero v. 
New York City Housing Authority,30 the defendants argued that “trivial 
behavior,” including kisses, arm strokes, “degrading epithets” and “other 
objectionable” conduct, was insufficiently pervasive to constitute a hostile 
work environment.31  Judge Richard Cardamone, writing for the court, 
“emphatically reject[ed] this argument” because an employee “need not 
subject herself to an extended period of demeaning and degrading 
provocation before being entitled to seek the remedies provided under Title 
VII.”32 
In deciding Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan Appliance Center, Inc.33 in 1992, 
the Second Circuit extended protection against retaliation to an employee 
who was subjected to an adverse employment decision for making an 
internal complaint protesting against sexual harassment.34  The court 
recognized that Title VII should protect employees who express opposition 
to sexual harassment, even if they had not filed a formal Title VII or Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) complaint.35  The court 
also recognized that employers should not be able to avoid Title VII 
liability where they promptly respond to a complaint of sexual harassment, 
but the response has all indications of a “sham.”36 
The Second Circuit continued its trajectory in a significant sexual 
harassment case decided in 1994.  In Karibian v. Columbia University,37 
the plaintiff alleged that her supervisor forced her into a violent sexual 
relationship, in return for which she received promotions and pay 
increases.38  The significance of Karibian, and what distinguished it from 
most “quid pro quo harassment cases”39 that had come before it, was that, at 
least for a period of time, the plaintiff experienced promotions and pay 
increases as a result of her sexual relations with her supervisor rather than 
 
 29. Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Co., No. B-74-251, 1976 WL 22169, at *4 (D. Conn. June 
11, 1976). 
 30. 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 31. Id. at 578. 
 32. Id. 
 33. 957 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 34. See id. at 65. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 64.  In Kotcher, there was evidence of a sham because the defendant’s only 
“punishment” of the alleged harasser was transfer to a different store where he soon was 
promoted to his previous position. See id.  This reaction to the complaint tended to indicate 
that the defendant “at least tolerated [the employee’s] unlawful harassing conduct.” Id. 
 37. 14 F.3d 773 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 38. See id. at 775–76. 
 39. The phrase “quid pro quo harassment case(s)” is used throughout this Article to refer 
to cases in which a supervisor suggests that he or she will provide a benefit to an employee 
in exchange for that employee’s satisfaction of a sexual demand. 
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being subjected to detrimental conditions because of a refusal to engage in 
sexual relations.40 
Judge Joseph McLaughlin’s opinion summarized the plaintiff’s account 
as follows: 
In 1987, while a student in Columbia University’s General Studies 
Program, Sharon Karibian worked in Columbia’s fundraising “Telefund” 
office. . . .  In September 1987, Columbia appointed defendant Mark 
Urban as Development Officer for Annual Giving at [University 
Development and Alumni Relations].  In that capacity, Urban had 
supervisory authority over Telefund, and, consequently, over 
Karibian . . . .  [According to Karibian,] Urban “pursued” Karibian by 
repeatedly inviting her out to bars, ostensibly to discuss work-related 
matters.  On those occasions, Urban often asked Karibian back to his 
apartment.  Initially, Karibian rebuffed Urban’s advances; ultimately, 
however, she yielded to pressure from Urban.  Specifically, Karibian 
claimed that Urban coerced her into a violent sexual relationship by 
telling her that she “owed him” for all he was doing for her as her 
supervisor.  Karibian also claimed that the conditions of her 
employment—including her raises, hours, autonomy and flexibility—
varied from time to time, depending on her responsiveness to Urban.  
Karibian stated that she believed she would be fired if she did not give in 
to Urban’s demands.41 
The plaintiff at first did not tell anyone about the nature of her 
relationship with Urban, but in September 1988 she contacted Columbia’s 
Panel on Sexual Harassment and also met with Columbia’s Equal 
Opportunity Coordinator.42  According to Karibian, individuals from each 
office “discouraged her from actively pursuing a complaint against Urban” 
and Karibian requested that the meetings be kept confidential.43  
Approximately one and a half years later, Karibian again met with 
Columbia’s Equal Opportunity Coordinator; this time, however, she did not 
insist on confidentiality.44  Columbia University ultimately forced Urban to 
resign “for reasons that remain somewhat vague” and laid off Karibian after 
the office where she worked was closed.45 
Although the parties sharply disputed the facts (Urban maintained that 
the sexual relations were consensual), the legal issue was significant:  
whether a plaintiff can bring a Title VII claim for sexual harassment when 
she suffered no economic harm as a result of the harassment.46  Columbia 
University successfully argued before the district court that, because the 
plaintiff had suffered no economic harm, she could not bring a claim 
 
 40. See Karibian, 14 F.3d at 775–76.  The plaintiff also alleged, however, that she 
suffered retaliation after she terminated the relationship. See Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 
930 F. Supp. 134, 140–41 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 41. Karibian, 14 F.3d at 775–76. 
 42. See id. at 776. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See id. at 775. 
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regarding the sexual harassment she claimed to experience.47  The district 
court also held that the plaintiff could not establish a hostile work 
environment claim against Columbia University because it did not have 
sufficient notice of Urban’s conduct and took reasonable steps in response 
to Karibian’s harassment complaints.48 
The Second Circuit reversed the district court on both grounds, using 
reasoning that was noteworthy at the time.49  First, the court addressed 
Karibian’s quid pro quo claim, holding that neither the language of Title 
VII nor relevant EEOC regulations required plaintiffs to provide evidence 
of economic harm to prevail.50  Instead, to establish a quid pro quo claim, 
the plaintiff was required to show (1) that she was subject to unwelcome 
sexual conduct and (2) “that her reaction to that conduct was then used as 
the basis for decisions affecting the compensation, terms, conditions or 
privileges of her employment.”51  Although the Second Circuit cited 
authority from other courts for its general statement of the law, the law was 
quite uncertain at the time.52  The three cases relied upon by the circuit, for 
instance, all involved instances of “classic” quid pro quo harassment in 
which the plaintiff suffered tangible harm to the terms and conditions of her 
 
 47. See id. at 776. 
 48. See id. at 777.  At the time, the difference under the law between quid pro quo 
harassment claims and hostile work environment claims was significant because an 
employer was strictly liable for quid pro quo harassment but not for hostile work 
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harassment claim because of a lack of economic harm, the district court failed to consider 
whether the plaintiff had stated a hostile work environment claim. See id. at 68.  The Court 
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employment because she refused to engage in sexual conduct with her 
supervisor.53 
The Karibian Court acknowledged that the “typical” quid pro quo case 
involves a circumstance in which the employee suffers retaliation because 
of her refusal to submit to a supervisor’s coercion, but the court concluded 
that it does not follow that tangible economic harm is “always essential to 
the claim.”54  At this point, the court turned to policy rather than precedent, 
observing that if Title VII barred “the victims of sexual harassment who 
surrender to unwelcome encounters[,] . . . [s]uch a rule would only 
encourage harassers to increase their persistence”—truly a perverse 
outcome.55 
Instead, the Karibian Court focused on two issues.  First, the court 
focused on whether the supervisor “linked tangible job benefits to the 
acceptance or rejection of sexual advances.”56  On this theory, the tangible 
benefit provided to the employee who submits to unwelcome advances is 
the retention of her employment.  Second, from the Second Circuit’s 
perspective, harassment law should focus on the supervisor’s prohibited 
conduct, not on the plaintiff’s reaction.57  Whether the plaintiff submitted to 
advances might help determine whether the sexual advances were 
unwelcome but “not whether unwelcome sexual advances were 
unlawful.”58 
The Karibian Court’s treatment of the plaintiff’s hostile work 
environment claim also broke new ground, for it helped determine when an 
employer would be strictly liable for tolerating a hostile work 
environment.59  At the time, the plaintiff in hostile work environment cases, 
unlike in quid pro quo harassment cases, had to show why the employer 
should be liable for the environment fostered by its employees.60  The 
Supreme Court had left this issue open in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. 
Vinson,61 which directed lower courts to draw from traditional agency 
principles to decide such liability.62  In 1992, in the Kotcher case discussed 
above,63 the circuit had found that there was enough evidence of the “sham” 
nature of the response to complaints of harassment to justify attributing 
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liability to the employer for its employee’s harassment.64  But Karibian 
presented a different set of facts, and the court turned back to traditional 
agency principles to determine the scope of an employer’s liability.65  First, 
however, the court rejected the bright-line rule advanced by Columbia 
University and apparently accepted by the district court, namely that in 
every case the plaintiff must prove that the employer either provided no 
“reasonable avenue” for complaints or knew of the harassment but took no 
action.66 
The circuit identified several factors that would influence whether an 
employer should be held liable for a hostile work environment claim under 
Title VII.  Most critical in Karibian was that the alleged harasser was a 
supervisor who used his delegated authority to create an abusive 
environment based on sex.67  Therefore, the circuit stated that the employer 
could be held liable because the supervisor was acting at least within the 
scope of his apparent authority.68  The court also held that an employer 
could be held liable where a supervisor is “aided in accomplishing the 
harassment by the existence of the agency relationship.”69  The court 
contrasted this situation with a situation in which a “low-level supervisor” 
does not perpetrate the harassment in reliance on his supervisory 
authority.70  There, the employer is not liable unless it failed to provide a 
reasonable avenue for complaints or did not take any action in the face of 
known harassment.71  In the Karibian case, the court found that there was 
enough evidence to go to the jury on the issue of whether Columbia 
University was responsible for the allegedly hostile work environment, 
stating “[i]t would be a jarring anomaly to hold that conduct which always 
renders an employer liable under a quid pro quo theory does not result in 
liability to the employer when that same conduct becomes so severe and 
pervasive as to create a discriminatorily abusive work environment.”72 
The Karibian case received attention immediately after it was announced.  
The New York Times described it as setting a precedent in the quid pro quo 
context, while also increasing the burden on defendants in hostile work 
environment cases.73  Although the contours of sexual harassment litigation 
have changed over the years, Karibian has withstood the test of time.  Most 
notably, four years after Karibian was announced, the Supreme Court 
issued two decisions, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton74 and Burlington 
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 65. See Karibian, 14 F.3d at 780. 
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Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,75 both of which collapsed the distinction between 
quid pro quo harassment claims and hostile work environment claims.76  
Rather than hinging vicarious liability on the characterization of the claim, 
the Supreme Court held in both cases that the proper focus was on whether 
the “supervisor’s harassment culminates in a tangible employment 
action.”77 
Even though the hard-line context in which Karibian operated had 
changed, the key insights from the decision survived.  A 2002 Second 
Circuit decision preserved Karibian’s reasoning even though the Supreme 
Court’s analyses in Faragher and Ellerth reframed sexual harassment 
law.78  Like Karibian, Jin v. Metropolitan Life Insurance79 was a case in 
which the plaintiff was coerced to have sex with her supervisor because he 
“explicitly threatened to fire her if she did not submit, and then allowed her 
to keep her job after she submitted.”80  Judge Wilfred Feinberg’s opinion 
for the court distinguished Ellerth (in which the supervisor’s threats were 
never carried out) because, unlike the plaintiff in Ellerth, the plaintiff in Jin 
was required to submit to sex in order to grant a tangible benefit (continued 
employment).81  The court concluded: 
[W]hen a victim is coerced into submitting to a supervisor’s sexual 
mistreatment, the threatened detrimental economic tangible employment 
action may not take place.  But that does not mean that the use of the 
submission as the basis for other job decisions does not also constitute 
tangible employment action.  Because Faragher and Ellerth support our 
earlier holding in Karibian that economic harm is not required to hold an 
employer liable in a submission case, we see no persuasive reason to 
abandon our prior judgment on that issue.82 
The Ninth Circuit followed the Second Circuit’s approach.  In Holly D. v. 
California Institute of Technology,83 the plaintiff claimed that her 
supervisor implicitly threatened to fire her if she did not submit to his 
sexual demands.84  The court held that when, “in order to avoid the 
threatened action, the employee complies with the supervisor’s demands,” a 
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tangible employment action occurs.85  The court stated that “when the 
supervisor actually coerces sex by abusing the employer’s authority, and 
thus makes concrete the condition of employment he has imposed,” his 
harassment “culminates in a ‘tangible employment action.’”86 
When then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg reflected on the 1970s cases in 
which she and her colleagues at the ACLU crafted a path toward heightened 
scrutiny of classifications based on gender, she highlighted principles that 
would come to characterize the Second Circuit’s nuanced approach to 
sexual harassment challenges:  interrogating the rationalization used by 
some courts to justify differential treatment of men and women based on 
“natural” differences and the link between subordination and sex-specific 
roles and relationships.87  Karibian and the other Second Circuit cases 
surrounding sexual harassment exemplify the same principles in a different 
context:  the need to challenge ideas about “natural” sexual relations and to 
see the link between subordination in the workplace and traditional ideas 
about how men and women relate to each other.  The Second Circuit’s 
approach continued the trajectory that Justice Ginsburg and other advocates 
had so successfully negotiated in the 1970s.  In so doing, the court left an 
important mark in the area. 
II.  THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S LEADING ROLE 
IN PRISONERS’ RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE 
The Second Circuit is home to one of the largest prison systems in the 
country:  the New York State Department of Corrections and Community 
Supervision.88  Moreover, New York City’s jails house more people than do 
many state correctional systems.89  Combine these variables with an active 
and well-established prisoners’ rights lawyering community, represented in 
small firms as well as large nonprofit organizations like the Legal Aid 
Society’s Prisoners’ Rights Project, and it is no surprise that the Second 
Circuit has been the focus of many significant prisoners’ rights cases. 
Most prisoners’ rights cases revolve around the meaning of the Eighth 
Amendment, which prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.”90  For a 
number of reasons that have been explored and discussed elsewhere, federal 
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courts did not begin to develop robust Eighth Amendment jurisprudence 
until the 1970s.91  While some state courts were called upon to interpret 
their own state constitutions’ punishment provisions in the 1800s, it is fair 
to say that the constitutionality of particular punishments, including the 
conditions of confinement experienced by people held in jails and prisons, 
was woefully underexamined for most of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries.92  To the extent that courts did examine the question, they 
deferred greatly to the judgment of legislators and prison administrators, 
prompting many to refer to the time period between the founding and the 
late twentieth century as a “hands-off” period.93 
Other than Weems v. United States,94 which was an unusual decision 
from 1910 in which the Supreme Court struck down a sentence imposed by 
a court in the Philippines, finding it to be cruel and unusual punishment,95 
the Court had given little hint that it questioned the orthodox view that 
courts had little to nothing to say about the daily living experience of people 
held in prisons or jails.  The first sign of any real change came almost fifty 
years later, in 1958, in Trop v. Dulles,96 in which the Supreme Court again 
struck down a punishment as being cruel and unusual.97  The question in 
Trop involved whether a sentence of denationalization as a punishment for 
military desertion was consistent with the Eighth Amendment.98  A 
plurality of the Court found that the sentence violated both the Eighth 
Amendment and international law principles because it was contrary to 
“evolving standards of decency.”99  This framework would become a 
central tenet of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as Trop was extended in 
1976 by Estelle v. Gamble,100 the first modern case to challenge prison 
conditions alone, separate and apart from a criminal sentence.  The Estelle 
Court looked to both Weems and Trop to establish that the Eighth 
Amendment applied to more than “physically barbarous punishments,”101 
but also to punishments incompatible with “evolving standards of 
decency”102 or involving the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of 
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pain.”103  With these standards in mind, the Court held that the government 
had some obligation to provide medical care to prisoners, because the 
absence of such care could “result in pain and suffering which no one 
suggests would serve any penological purpose.”104  Deprivations of medical 
care that amounted to “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs” 
were equivalent, in the Court’s view, to unnecessary infliction of pain.105 
From Estelle, much significant prisoners’ rights litigation was born, 
including cases involving mental health treatment, protection from harm 
from other prisoners, challenges to material conditions of confinement such 
as cell size, food, and sanitary conditions, and use of force by correctional 
staff.106  From Trop on, however, the Second Circuit has played a 
significant role in the development of constitutional protections for people 
held in our nation’s prisons and jails. 
Trop originated in the Eastern District of New York.  The plaintiff had 
served in the U.S. Army in 1944 in French Morocco, but he was convicted 
by court-martial of desertion in the time of war.107  Under the governing 
statute at the time, his conviction of desertion resulted in his expatriation.108  
He filed a complaint in the Eastern District seeking a declaration that he 
was a “national of the United States.”109  The district court summarily 
dismissed his complaint, and the Second Circuit upheld the dismissal.110  
The majority opinion, however, specifically declined to address the 
question of whether the punishment was consistent with the Eighth 
Amendment, finding that the plaintiff had not raised that issue.111  Chief 
Judge Charles Clark wrote an extremely brief dissent, incorporating fully 
the arguments made in a comment that appeared in the Yale Law 
Journal.112  Although Chief Judge Clark’s dissent was only two paragraphs 
long, he was prescient in recognizing the critical role of “dignity” in Eighth 
Amendment review, a word that the Court ultimately has adopted as a 
touchstone for Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.113 
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The Supreme Court seemed moved by Chief Judge Clark’s dissent, 
because the Court granted certiorari and reversed, marking a significant turn 
in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.114  Moreover, the plurality opinion 
specifically indicated its agreement with Chief Judge Clark’s dissent and 
quoted the first paragraph in full.115  Although Trop’s “evolving standards 
of decency” framework116 would ultimately play a central role in Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence, the case did not initially have a wide impact.  It 
was not until 1976 that the Supreme Court expanded Trop’s analysis to 
conditions of confinement in Estelle.117 
Between 1958 and 1976, however, the Second Circuit established itself 
as a court with admirable foresight about how judicial regulation of prison 
conditions could be accomplished through the Eighth Amendment.  The 
first example of such a case began in the early 1960s in Wright v. 
McMann.118  Lawrence Wright was serving a life sentence in Clinton 
Correctional Facility after being convicted, by a jury in state court, of 
sodomy, assault, and carnal abuse of an eleven-year-old boy.119  In 
February 1965, he was placed in solitary confinement for what was only 
described as “a violation of a prison regulation.”120 
According to Wright’s complaint, which he filed pro se: 
[T]he . . . solitary confinement cell . . . was dirty, filthy and unsanitary, 
without adequate heat and virtually barren; the toilet and sink were 
encrusted with slime, dirt and human excremental residue superimposed 
thereon[.]  [Wright] was without clothing and entirely nude for several 
days . . . until he was given a thin pair of underwear to put on[.]  [Wright] 
was unable to keep himself clean or perform normal hygienic functions as 
he was denied the use of soap, towel, toilet paper, tooth brush, comb, and 
other hygienic implements and utensils therefore[.]  [Wright] was 
compelled under threat of violence, assault or other increased 
punishments to remain standing at military attention in front of his cell 
door each time an officer appeared from 7:30 A.M. to 10:00 P.M. every 
day, and he was not permitted to sleep during the said hours under the 
pain and threat of being beaten or otherwise disciplined therefore[.]  [T]he 
windows in front of his confinement cell were opened wide throughout 
the evening and night hours of each day during subfreezing temperatures 
causing [him] to be exposed to the cold air and winter weather without 
clothing or other means of protecting himself or to escape the detrimental 
effects thereof . . . .121 
According to his complaint, he was forced to sleep on the cold, rough, 
concrete floor, as the cell had no furniture apart from a sink and toilet.122  
He was kept continuously in that cell for a total of thirty-three days and, a 
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year later, was again placed in a “strip cell” for twenty-one consecutive 
days for violating another prison rule.123  Wright requested injunctive relief 
and monetary damages. 
The district court denied Wright’s claim on the ground that (1) “[t]he 
complaint makes no sufficient showing of the denial of plaintiff’s 
constitutional rights” and, in the alternative, (2) “[p]laintiff’s remedy, if 
any, lies in the state courts.”124  As to the former, the district court found 
that the complaint failed to demonstrate “exceptional circumstances” of 
confinement to rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation.125  In 
the absence of controlling authority governing the specific conditions of 
Wright’s confinement, the court was “content to hold that the complaint, 
which lack[ed] allegations of physical injury,” failed to show a departure 
from accepted methods of prison punishment.126  The court reasoned that 
“[e]very punishment in a sense involves cruelty since it imposes by force 
conditions at odds with the concept of the freedom of the person from all 
forms of trespass, and freedom of action.”127  With respect to the alternative 
ground for the court’s holding, its reasoning rested on “[t]he general rule 
that the internal administration of state prisons is the state’s primary 
responsibility and not a matter of federal intervention.”128  In other words, 
the district court’s opinion was consistent with the “hands-off” doctrine that 
had characterized federal jurisprudence at that time. 
More than a decade before the Supreme Court would address (albeit in a 
sideways fashion) solitary confinement conditions in a case out of 
Arkansas,129 the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s decision in 
Wright.  In an opinion authored by Judge Irving Kaufman, the Second 
Circuit embraced a far more muscular role for the federal judiciary in 
policing the living experience of people in prison.130  The court rejected the 
State’s attempt to justify the confinement as “necessary” for prison 
regulation and admitted that Wright’s treatment was “strictly routine” for a 
violation of prison discipline.131  Finding that the conditions “offend[ed] 
more than ‘some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism,’” the 
court held that, if proven, they would “constitute cruel and unusual 
punishment.”132  Rejecting the “hands-off” policy of deference to prison 
officials in the State’s punishment practices, the court held that “civilized 
standards of humane decency simply do not permit a man for a substantial 
period of time to be denuded and exposed to the bitter cold of winter in 
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northern New York State and to be deprived of the basic elements of 
hygiene such as soap and toilet paper.”133  Echoing Chief Judge Clark’s call 
to consider the dignity of the plaintiff in Trop, the Wright Court observed 
that “[t]he subhuman conditions alleged by Wright to exist in the ‘strip cell’ 
at Dannemora could only serve to destroy completely the spirit and 
undermine the sanity of the prisoner.”134  The court therefore remanded to 
the district court to allow Wright to proceed on his claims.135 
On remand, Wright’s case was consolidated with that of another prisoner, 
Robert Mosher.136  In a long and eloquent opinion, the district judge, newly 
assigned to the case (because the judge to whom the case was first assigned 
had died), wrote that horrid prison conditions were a systemic problem and 
renounced the rationale that “if unpleasant problems arise in the prisons, the 
prisoners brought it on themselves and the less public notice the better.”137  
Taking a cue from the Second Circuit, the lower court stated that “[n]o 
longer can prisons and their inmates be considered a closed society with 
every internal disciplinary judgment to be blissfully regarded as immune 
from the limelight that all public agencies ordinarily are subject to.”138 
Though the court acknowledged that security in maximum-security 
prisons is an important state objective, it asserted that this interest can 
“never” justify treatment and prison procedures that violate human decency 
and constitutional rights.139  While the court posited that segregation under 
proper conditions in a state prison is not unconstitutional per se, it credited 
testimony from a psychiatrist who testified to “the care to be taken 
concerning its conditions and the length of its use due to the serious impact 
it may have upon certain prisoners [because of] their individual mental and 
physical attitudes and capacities.”140  The court ultimately rested its finding 
of unconstitutional punishment on the physical conditions of the cell (e.g., 
filthy, barren, etc.), and the abuse to which Wright was subjected (e.g., 
being forced to sleep nude on a rough concrete floor with no windows in 
the winter).141  Wright was ultimately granted $1,500 in compensatory 
damages and no punitive damages.142 
The court similarly found aspects of Mosher’s punishment to be 
unconstitutional.  Mosher had been placed in solitary confinement for five 
months for failing to sign a “safety sheet,” which he genuinely believed 
would constitute waiver to sue the State for personal injuries suffered due to 
negligence.143  The district court held that, with respect to the alleged 
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Eighth Amendment violations, Mosher’s initial segregation and 
prolongation of that segregation was a “grossly disproportionate 
punishment” for the offense he committed.144  The court thus granted 
positive injunctive relief, requiring the prisons to promulgate (1) rules 
ensuring that segregation cell facilities were adequate to safeguard the 
health of occupants and (2) rules governing (a) procedures of prison 
disciplinary hearings, (b) the conditions of psychiatric observation, and (c) 
procedures to determine whether an inmate should be confined to such a 
cell.145  The State appealed.146 
On this second appeal, the Second Circuit relied on an intervening en 
banc decision in order to reverse the district court’s imposition that the 
State promulgate rules and regulations governing disciplinary hearings and 
procedures used in determining whether an inmate should be confined to a 
psychiatric observation cell.147  Still careful to voice its admonition of 
“inhumane, degrading treatment,” the court, in an opinion by Judge J. 
Edward Lumbard, deferred to the New York legislature, which had recently 
enacted and amended laws to respond to these conditions.148  But while the 
court absolved the State from having to make new prison rules, it affirmed 
the district court’s findings of unconstitutional conditions for each 
plaintiff.149 
With respect to Wright, the court held that the Warden of Clinton could 
be personally liable because he knew of the inhumane conditions in the 
strip cells.150  The court sympathized that “Wright should be properly 
compensated for the suffering he endured, and recovery should not be 
defeated by an attempt by the warden to shift responsibility to 
inferiors . . . when responsibility for permitting such conditions to exist was 
ultimately, in any event, squarely his.”151 
As for Mosher, while the court noted that an “inmate alleging 
disproportionate punishment will ordinarily have a heavy burden,” it found 
that he successfully met that burden.152  Specifically, the court found that 
placing Mosher in solitary confinement for five months for failing to sign a 
“safety sheet,” out of the belief that doing so would constitute a waiver of 
his right to sue, constituted disproportionate punishment.153  The purpose of 
the sheet was simply to assure that inmates were familiar with safety 
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regulations, and even the Warden testified that “segregation as punishment 
for refusal to sign the sheet was inappropriate.”154 
Wright laid the groundwork for many subsequent prison conditions cases, 
which became particularly important in the wake of the Attica riots in 
September of 1971.155  One commentator has described Wright as one of 
the first cases to reflect increasing skepticism “about the benevolence of 
government and the capacity of the experts to ‘rehabilitate,’ 
and . . . sensitiv[ity] to claims of fairness, equal treatment, and due 
process.”156  Around the time that the Second Circuit handed down the 
decision, Judge Kaufman described it as part of a trend in judges 
“abandon[ing] the traditional judicial resistance to correcting any but the 
most egregious injustice in the prison system.”157  With its emphasis on 
dignity and “civilized standards of humane decency,” the decision foresaw 
many of the themes and standards that the Supreme Court ultimately would 
adopt in its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.158  Even now, with its 
recognition that proportionality principles should apply to punishment 
meted out within prison, and not just punishment handed down by the 
sentencing judge, Wright’s principles play a significant role in ongoing 
challenges to the use of solitary confinement throughout the country.159 
Wright is just one of many cases in which the Second Circuit has helped 
to develop prisoners’ rights jurisprudence.  In 1970, the Second Circuit 
found that a prisoner stated a claim under the Eighth Amendment where he 
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was treated with “deliberate indifference,”160 and six years later the 
Supreme Court adopted that standard when it held that prisoners have a 
constitutional right to minimally adequate health care.161  The Second 
Circuit was one of the first courts of appeals to apply the “deliberate 
indifference” framework to claims that prison officials failed to protect 
prisoners from assault at the hands of other prisoners162—almost a decade 
before the Supreme Court did the same.163  Although the Second Circuit 
was sometimes so far ahead of the curve that the Supreme Court expressed 
profound disagreement with the appellate court’s intervention in the 
workings of prisons and jails,164 the following excerpt from one of the 
circuit’s many cases involving prison and jail conditions testifies to its 
leading role in protecting prisoners’ rights: 
The conditions in our prisons are inextricably related to our system of 
criminal justice and what might otherwise be lawful detention becomes an 
unconstitutional restriction when those conditions become so 
dehumanizing as to constitute an additional hardship beyond the need for 
custody in violation of the detainees’ due process and equal protection 
rights.  The failure in the past of legislators to take the proper correctional 
action to remedy these inhuman conditions for both detainees and 
convicted prisoners has eroded the historical reluctance of federal courts 
to interfere with the administration of penal institutions.  Indeed this 
failure has required the courts to take action in the interests of 
fundamental decency and the protection of the constitutional rights of the 
inmates.165 
In the Supreme Court’s recent reminder that prisoners “retain the essence 
of human dignity inherent in all persons,”166 one can hear the echoes of the 
Second Circuit’s longstanding prisoners’ rights jurisprudence.  The Second 
Circuit is one of the courts that has led the way in recognizing that a prison 
system that deprives people of that dignity “has no place in a civilized 
society,” prompting the judicial responsibility to provide a remedy, even if 
it requires intruding on the decision making of prison officials.167 
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III.  THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S LEADING ROLE 
PROTECTING ACCESS TO PUBLIC BENEFITS 
The Second Circuit has developed substantial jurisprudence around 
issues concerning public benefits, including public assistance, Social 
Security, and Supplemental Security Income (SSI).  In particular, the court 
has emphasized the importance of fair process in determinations of 
eligibility.  Fair process is essential to the administration of benefit 
programs for a number of reasons.  First, it is a necessary means of ensuring 
that benefits reach those for whom such programs were intended.  
Erroneous denials of benefits have plagued the administration of these 
programs for decades, leading them to fall short of the protection and 
support they were created to provide.168  Second, judicial review of agency 
procedure in determining eligibility is critical to treatment of benefits as 
legal entitlements, rather than simple gratuities provided by the state.169  
The proposition that applicants can sue to establish fair procedures is vital 
in bringing the rule of law to the administration of public benefits, ensuring 
that officials are required to adhere to articulated standards and processes.  
This also signals to beneficiaries that they are rights holders—rather than 
supplicants—who can thus hold their government accountable as to those 
rights.170  Taken together, procedural rights have a major impact on the 
power relationship and dynamics between clients and street-level 
administrators.  By stressing the importance of fair process, the Second 
Circuit has played a key role in shaping how we think about public benefit 
programs and how they operate today. 
A.  Public Assistance 
The 1960s brought about a revolution in the way that public benefit 
programs are conceived and administered.  The Second Circuit was at the 
forefront of this revolution, largely through its involvement in Goldberg v. 
Kelly,171 one of the foundational cases in the field.172  While Goldberg is 
often cited as the fount of the “new property” jurisprudence,173 or the 
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source of the elements of due process, the discussion here focuses on 
Goldberg’s grounding in the conditions and strategies that surrounded 
public assistance administration in New York City in the late 1960s.  
Goldberg began with the filing of Kelly v. Wyman174 in 1968 by attorneys at 
MFY Legal Services, the first law office established with the mission of 
fighting poverty, rather than the more general aim of simply providing 
representation to indigent clients.175  From the start, Goldberg was intended 
to break new ground.  On one level, the action involved a narrow issue 
concerning an individual’s right to a hearing prior to the termination of 
public assistance benefits.  On a much higher level, however, the case 
presented the sweeping legal questions of whether individuals could assert 
rights afforded under property law in the context of public assistance and 
what legal rights they had against state agencies.176 
The objective of Goldberg was to replace a system of discretionary 
administration, where welfare caseworkers exercised extraordinary 
authority over clients, with a legal regime bounded by rules to limit and 
check caseworkers.177  Prior to Goldberg, a caseworker could threaten a 
client with immediate termination of benefits for failure to comply with a 
directive, throwing the client’s life into immediate turmoil.178  While an 
appeal could lead to the restoration of benefits at some later date, the 
damage to the client already would have occurred.179  Clients pushed back 
against caseworkers’ decisions at their peril.  But, after Goldberg, the client 
could appeal, thereby staying the termination until the decision received 
independent review.180  If the termination lacked a sound basis, it would 
never go into effect. 
Goldberg plaintiff John Kelly’s situation illustrates the impact of this 
change in procedure.181  Kelly’s caseworker had directed him to move out 
of one single-room-occupancy (SRO) hotel and into another.182  Given the 
caseworker’s control over his benefits, Kelly complied with this request 
despite finding the second hotel to be filled with addicts and alcoholics.183  
Kelly, finding his living situation to be untenable, eventually moved out of 
the second hotel.184  When the clerk at the second SRO reported to the 
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caseworker that Kelly had moved out, the caseworker terminated Kelly’s 
benefits and then refused to meet with him.185  As a result, Kelly was forced 
to live on the streets.186 
Advocates for assistance recipients viewed the right to a pretermination 
hearing as key to their efforts to mobilize a grassroots movement of 
recipients.187  At the time, the National Welfare Rights Organization was 
actively seeking to build a campaign through protests, sit-ins, and 
demonstrations, including sit-ins held at the office of Jack Goldberg, the 
Commissioner of Social Services for the City of New York.188  Organizers 
focused on urging recipients to claim grants for which they were eligible 
and to seek hearings if denied.189  Absent a right to a pretermination 
hearing, the potential for retaliation against a recipient was a major 
impediment. 
While much attention has been paid to Justice William Brennan’s 
landmark Supreme Court opinion in Goldberg, there has been less focus on 
the critical role played by Second Circuit Judge Wilfred Feinberg’s district 
court opinion.  To clarify, Goldberg was assigned to a three-judge district 
court panel,190 presided over by Judge Feinberg, who had been elevated to 
the circuit court only a few years before.  The State of New York responded 
to the lawsuit by issuing regulations requiring notice and some form of 
pretermination process.191  The state regulations offered localities two 
options.  Option (a) offered recipients the opportunity to appear before an 
official, superior to the one who made the decision, and present oral or 
written evidence with the aid of an attorney or other representative.192  
Option (b) provided recipients only the opportunity to submit written 
statements demonstrating continued eligibility.193  New York City was the 
only locality in the state to elect option (b).194  Thus, the thrust of the three-
judge panel’s analysis—and of the Supreme Court’s analysis—focused on 
the adequacy of the process provided, rather than on the right to process as 
a threshold matter.195 
Judge Feinberg’s opinion set forth a framework that has become famous 
in the form of Justice Brennan’s opinion in Goldberg.  Judge Feinberg’s 
opinion detailed the impact of the destitution that the plaintiffs faced, to 
which Justice Brennan only alluded.196  For example, Judge Feinberg’s 
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opinion discussed the allegations of proposed intervenor Angela Velez, 
whose benefits were terminated because her husband allegedly visited her 
home every night.197  By the time of the ruling, the State had provided 
Velez with a posttermination hearing concluding that the allegations were 
not valid.198  In the opinion, Judge Feinberg stressed that during the four 
months between the termination of benefits and the hearing decision, Ms. 
Velez and her three children had been evicted and forced to live in a single 
room in her sister’s apartment—who herself had nine children.199  Judge 
Feinberg’s opinion also described plaintiff Esther Lett’s plight, whose 
benefits were terminated on the ground that she had concealed 
employment.200  Lett and her three children were forced to survive on 
handouts from neighbors and became ill after eating spoiled food.201  Lett 
fainted from hunger while seeking emergency aid at a welfare center.202 
These facts set a persuasive backdrop for Judge Feinberg’s strong 
opinion, which stressed that “to cut off a welfare recipient in the face of this 
kind of ‘brutal need’ without a prior hearing of some sort is 
unconscionable.”203  Judge Feinberg wrote, “there is one overpowering fact 
which controls here.  By hypothesis, a welfare recipient is destitute, without 
funds or assets.”204  Against this strong imperative, Judge Feinberg weighed 
the costs of providing pretermination procedures and of paying out benefits 
in the interim before a hearing.205  However, he noted, these costs were 
substantially within the control of the city and state, since they controlled 
the timing of the hearings.206 
Judge Feinberg also found that the pretermination process provided by 
the City of New York (i.e., option (b)) did not provide an effective 
opportunity to be heard.207  Rejecting the sufficiency of a hearing through 
written submissions, he wrote that “[n]ot only is the right to a personal 
appearance ordinarily implicit in the constitutional concept of a fair hearing, 
but the reality of the status of many welfare recipients makes the invitation 
to submit their cases in writing cruelly ironic.”208  He cited the vagueness of 
the charges, the lack of education of many welfare recipients, and the fact 
that eligibility can often be determined by a simple interchange of questions 
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and answers as necessitating an opportunity for an in-person oral 
hearing.209 
Justice Brennan’s opinion for the Supreme Court provides a significantly 
broader and more sweeping discussion of the basics of a fair hearing under 
the Due Process Clause than did Judge Feinberg’s opinion.210  Judge Henry 
J. Friendly, for example, critiqued the Court for the breadth of its ruling.211  
Nonetheless, Judge Feinberg’s decision contains the essence of what was so 
powerful about Goldberg—its recognition that the realities of destitution 
are not only relevant but are of paramount importance in determining the 
scope of the process that is due.212  In this sense, Goldberg bursts through 
the bounds of formalism by looking to the situation on the ground and to 
people’s lives as they live them.  The vast potential of this approach was 
sharply curtailed in later cases such as Mathews v. Eldridge,213 which went 
to the opposite extreme of looking to legal rules and categories to determine 
the extent of due process.214  Years later, Justice Brennan reflected back on 
Goldberg, seeing it as a crucial statement about the importance of passion 
and empathy in the law.215 
One of the key ways in which Goldberg recognizes the importance of 
human interaction to fair adjudication is through its emphasis on giving 
recipients the opportunity to appear in person before the decision maker and 
to engage in direct, oral exchange.216  This emphasis on the oral hearing 
reflects a longstanding Second Circuit value:  while many courts of appeals 
have greatly curtailed the practice of oral argument, in the Second Circuit 
oral argument is the norm rather than the exception.217 
Although the efforts to organize welfare recipients into a social 
movement did not have long-term success, the pretermination hearing 
mandated by Goldberg has proven to be an important safeguard for 
recipients.  Nevertheless, the accuracy of terminations of benefits remains a 
major issue in public assistance.218  The form that the pretermination 
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hearing takes often leaves much to be desired because the vast majority of 
claimants appear pro se,219 are left to fight terminations in a hearing that 
often spans just seven minutes, and usually do not have the chance to 
review a copy of the agency’s evidence beforehand.220 
The emphasis on work requirements in welfare reform also has made the 
sanctioning of recipients a major feature of public assistance administration, 
placing recipients at greater risk of erroneous determinations in their 
cases.221  Additionally, welfare recipients are vulnerable to the phenomenon 
of churning, which is the process of cycling eligible welfare recipients on 
and off benefits within a short period of time in an effort to reduce welfare 
rolls through burdensome or heightened eligibility requirements.222  
Against this backdrop, Goldberg is more critical than ever and looms larger 
than ever as a truly remarkable jurisprudential achievement. 
B.  Disability Benefits 
While Goldberg is a case in which the Second Circuit made a key 
contribution to the realm of fair process in public assistance programs in a 
single decision, the court has had a sustained impact on the system for the 
administration of disability benefits through the Social Security Act (“the 
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caseworker or to meet some other deadline”); see also Anna Lou Dehavenon, Charles 
Dickens Meets Franz Kafka:  The Maladministration of New York City’s Public Assistance 
Programs, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 231 (1990) (discussing churning and the 
negative effects it imposes on welfare recipients); David J. Kennedy, Due Process in a 
Privitized Welfare System, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 231, 241–50 (1998) (same). 
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Act”) by issuing dozens of decisions over the years.223  In Kerner v. 
Flemming,224 the Second Circuit established a framework for reviewing 
denials of benefits that has set the tone for judicial review and has 
developed into a national norm.  Twenty years later, the court built on this 
framework to play a key role in what amounted to a judicial rebellion 
against President Ronald Reagan’s rollback of disability benefit 
programs.225  This confrontation between the executive and judicial 
branches is notable because it took place on a national scale—involving 
thousands of cases—and was largely shaped by the courts of appeals rather 
than the Supreme Court.226  And no court of appeals was more vigorous in 
upholding the rights of claimants than the Second Circuit. 
The disability benefit programs of the Act were added in the 1950s, 
decades after its initial passage during the New Deal era in 1935.227  The 
Disability Insurance Benefit Program228 was added in 1956 and the SSI 
program229 was added approximately twenty years later.  Kerner, decided in 
1960, was one of the first circuit decisions on an appeal from a denial of 
benefits claim under the Act.  Judge Henry Friendly’s opinion was widely 
influential in setting a tone for how courts would scrutinize agency action 
under the new program. 
In Kerner, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare had concluded 
that the plaintiff, Philip Kerner, could not return to his previous work as a 
furniture upholsterer due to a heart condition but, nevertheless, had denied 
him benefits on the ground that the record did not establish that Kerner was 
precluded from performing light-duty or sedentary work.230  Judge Friendly 
quickly established that, although the court’s scope of review is limited 
under the Act, judicial review could be, and would be, quite rigorous.231  
He opened the analysis by referring to the Secretary’s regulations as written 
in “characteristic Janus-faced fashion” and went on to describe the 
Secretary’s treatment of the evidence as “exceedingly unsatisfactory.”232  
 
 223. See, e.g., Hidalgo v. Bowen, 822 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1987); De Leon v. Sec’y of 
Health & Human Servs., 734 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1984); Carroll v. Sec’y of Health & Human 
Servs., 705 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1983); Bastien v. Califano, 572 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1978); Gold 
v. Sec’y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 463 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1972). 
 224. 283 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1960). 
 225. See infra note 258. 
 226. The Supreme Court did weigh in on a number of occasions, but often sided with the 
Social Security Administration (SSA) rather than with the claimants.  For example, while 
Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521 (1990), and Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467 
(1986), were major victories for claimants at the Supreme Court, Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 
137 (1987), Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104 (1984), and Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 
(1983), were decided in favor of the government. 
 227. See Matthew Diller, Entitlement and Exclusion:  The Role of Disability in the Social 
Welfare System, 44 UCLA L. REV. 361, 386 (1996). 
 228. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (2012). 
 229. Id. § 1381. 
 230. See Kerner v. Flemming, 283 F.2d 916, 918 (2d Cir. 1960). 
 231. See id. at 922. 
 232. Id. at 919.  Judge Friendly was referring to the fact that the regulations provided an 
example of a disabling impairment while at the same time saying that the existence of such 
an impairment or an impairment of great severity “will not in and of itself always permit a 
finding that an individual is under a disability as defined in the law.” Id. (quoting 20 C.F.R. 
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Judge Friendly critiqued the manner in which the Secretary had assessed 
Kerner’s limitations, ignoring Kerner’s own testimony and the reports of 
numerous physicians.233  Judge Friendly also focused on the Secretary’s 
treatment of the question of whether, given his limitations, Kerner could 
actually work:  “[m]ere theoretical ability to engage in substantial gainful 
activity is not enough if no reasonable opportunity for this is available.”234 
The Secretary had contended that it was Kerner’s burden to establish that 
he was incapable of substantial gainful activity.235  The court’s response to 
the government’s argument has shaped Social Security law ever since:  
where a claimant has “raised a serious question and the evidence affords no 
sufficient basis for the Secretary’s negative answer,” the court should 
remand to the agency for additional evidence so that it can make specific 
findings on what the claimant can and cannot do and whether, in light of 
these limitations, work exists that the claimant can perform.236  Thus, the 
opinion makes clear that given Kerner’s initial showing, the Secretary could 
not rest simply on a generic argument about the burden of proof and, in 
particular, that the Secretary has the expertise to “furnish information as to 
the employment opportunities . . . or the lack of them, for persons of 
plaintiff’s skills and limitations.”237  Contrasting Social Security disability 
benefits with Veterans Administration benefits, the court emphasized that 
the fact that Congress had accorded judicial review to Social Security 
disability claimants means that the court had an obligation to ensure that the 
Secretary has reached a rational determination.238 
Kerner had a number of major impacts.  First, the decision laid the 
groundwork for the now well-accepted doctrine that when a claimant 
establishes an inability to return to past work due to a medical impairment, 
the agency bears the burden of demonstrating that there is other work in the 
economy for which the claimant is capable and qualified to perform.239  
Kerner thus relieves plaintiffs of the insurmountable burden of establishing 
the negative:  that there is no work that he or she can perform.  If the agency 
believes that a significantly impaired claimant can work, it must justify the 
basis for its conclusion.  Kerner led the Social Security Administration 
(SSA) to adopt a regular practice in the 1960s of introducing the testimony 
 
§ 404.1501(d) (1959)).  The term “Janus-faced” is one the Second Circuit would reuse when 
referring to the SSA. See Hidalgo v. Bowen, 822 F.2d 294, 299 (2d Cir. 1987).  For a 
discussion of the ambiguities in the SSA’s initial implementation of the disability insurance 
program, see Diller, supra note 227. 
 233. See Kerner, 283 F.2d at 921. 
 234. Id. (citing Aaron v. Fleming, 168 F. Supp. 291, 295 (M.D. Ala. 1958)). 
 235. See id. 
 236. Id. at 922. 
 237. Id.; see also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987). 
 238. See Kerner, 283 F.2d at 922. 
 239. See id.  Kerner also led to substantial confusion about what vocational and 
employment factors the SSA should consider in determining disability. See Diller, supra 
note 227.  This confusion was resolved by Congress in the 1967 Amendments, which made 
clear that a claimant’s age, education, and work experience would be considered, but the 
availability of particular job openings would not be considered. Social Security Amendments 
of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 821 (1968). 
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of a vocational expert in each hearing to meet this burden by addressing the 
question of whether, given a claimant’s limitations and the inability to 
perform past work, there is other work in the economy available for the 
plaintiff.240  In the late 1970s, the SSA replaced this system with a medical-
vocational matrix (known as “the grid”), which is treated as a finding of fact 
in each claim where the terms of the matrix are met.241 
Second, Kerner established that courts would give close consideration to 
the claimant’s testimony about the impact of his or her impairments and the 
views of medical sources, including those of the claimant’s treating 
physician.242  The court’s consideration of different views of medical 
evidence blossomed into an entire jurisprudence on the weight to be 
accorded to different medical sources and has played a major role in 
transforming judicial review from what could have been a toothless exercise 
into a potent safeguard for claimants. 
In Gold v. Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare,243 the court again 
took the SSA to task in reviewing its determination that claimant Minnie 
Gold had failed to establish disability by the date on which her Social 
Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) expired.244  Judge J. Joseph Smith 
reviewed the numerous reports of the physicians who had treated Gold that 
had been discounted by the hearing examiner and concluded that “[t]he 
expert opinions of plaintiff’s treating physicians as to plaintiff’s 
disability . . . are binding upon the referee if not controverted by substantial 
evidence to the contrary.”245  This is the first full statement of what would 
later be referred to as the Second Circuit’s “treating physician rule.”  The 
language was a quote from a district court decision in Indiana (which had 
cited Kerner),246 and its adoption by the Second Circuit would have major 
consequences.  Judge Smith went on to critique the hearing examiner for his 
harsh treatment of Gold, noting that she was “handicapped by lack of 
counsel, ill health, and inability to speak English,” which, in the court’s 
view, called for greater care and solicitude.247  Instead, the court described 
the examiner as showing “intolerance of her confusion and inability to 
digest the written exhibits with which she was faced shortly before the 
hearing began.”248  In view of the strength of the treating physicians’ 
 
 240. See Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 461 (1983). 
 241. See id. at 461–62. 
 242. See Kerner, 283 F.2d at 920–21. 
 243. 463 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1972). 
 244. See id. at 40.  Under the Act, a claimant must meet the disability standard within a 
specific time period of ceasing work. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (2012).  Gold did not apply for 
benefits until many years later and was required to establish disability as of the date she was 
last insured. Gold, 463 F.2d at 40–41. 
 245. Gold, 463 F.2d at 42 (quoting Walker v. Gardner, 266 F. Supp. 998, 1002 (S.D. Ind. 
1967)). 
 246. See Walker, 266 F. Supp. at 1002.  The Walker Court also cited Teeter v. Fleming, 
270 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1959), a Seventh Circuit decision which stated that treating physician 
opinions, while admissible, are not binding per se, but because the opinions were not 
contradicted in that case, they were controlling. See id. at 871. 
 247. Gold, 463 F.2d at 43. 
 248. Id. 
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opinions and what had transpired at the hearing, the court remanded for 
payment of benefits rather than the adduction of new evidence—an 
important extension of its analysis in Kerner in terms of the weight it placed 
on the claimant’s treating physician’s opinion.249 
In the years that followed, the Second Circuit would return to the treating 
physician rule repeatedly as a central lens through which to analyze 
disability benefit appeals.  It came to the fore most significantly in dealing 
with the Reagan administration’s major roll back in the disability benefit 
programs in the early 1980s.  In 1981, the new administration targeted both 
SSDI and SSI as major sources of cost savings and viewed them as the 
poster children for the expansion of the welfare state that it was determined 
to halt.250  This major change in course led to the termination of benefits of 
hundreds of thousands of recipients and a sharp drop in the allowance rate 
on new claims.251  It became a significant political issue, generating 
editorials around the country, and ultimately congressional action.  The 
administration tackled the disability benefit programs on two fronts.  First, 
it launched a broad program of reviewing the claims of individuals who 
were already receiving benefits and terminating the benefits of large 
numbers of recipients.252  Second, the administration toughened the 
standards for initial applications, thereby substantially reducing allowance 
rates.253  In reviewing the status of ongoing recipients, the administration 
accorded no initial presumption of disability.254  This meant that the fact 
that a recipient had previously been determined to be eligible was given no 
weight in the review.255  To the contrary, the new, more stringent standards 
were applied, resulting in findings that 495,000 recipients were “no longer 
disabled” despite the fact that there had been no finding of medical 
improvement.256 
This retrenchment flooded the courts with appeals from disability benefit 
denials and terminations.257  Many judges recoiled at the harsh and 
 
 249. See id. at 44. 
 250. See generally MARTHA DERTHICK, AGENCY UNDER STRESS:  THE SOCIAL SECURITY 
ADMINISTRATION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1990); JENNIFER L. ERKULWATER, DISABILITY 
RIGHTS AND THE AMERICAN SOCIAL SAFETY NET (2006); SUSAN GLUCK MEZEY, NO LONGER 
DISABLED:  THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY (1988). 
 251. The tightening of disability standards began under the Carter administration based 
on a recognition that the disability benefit programs were growing rapidly. See 
ERKULWATER, supra note 250, at 94–105.  As Martha Derthick has put it, what was 
contemplated in 1980 as a process of review of recipients’ eligibility was implemented in 
1981 as a purge. See DERTHICK, supra note 250, at 36–37. 
 252. See Beth S. Glassman, Terminating Social Security Disability Benefits:  Another 
Burden for the Disabled?, 12 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 195, 195–96 (1983). 
 253. See ERKULWATER, supra note 250, at 108–09 (noting a process of gradual tightening 
of eligibility standards). 
 254. See DERTHICK, supra note 250, at 5. 
 255. See id. 
 256. See id. 
 257. See ERKULWATER, supra note 250, at 124–26; L. Stuart Ditzen, Denied Disability 
Benefits, Many Turn to the Courts, PHILA. INQUIRER (Feb. 1, 1986), http://articles. 
philly.com/1986-02-01/news/26089139_1_disability-benefits-eligibility-reviews-federal-
courts [https://perma.cc/M2BV-A2LV]. 
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draconian results that flowed from the initiative,258 particularly from the 
SSA’s announced policy of nonacquiescence—its refusal to adopt rules 
announced by the courts of appeals at the administrative level—in 
adjudicating cases other than the specific claim before the court that 
articulated the rule.259  The nonacquiesence policy limited the impact of 
judicial review to the individual claims appealed to the judicial level, 
denying other claimants the benefit of judicially articulated standards.  It 
was a red flag to the courts as it threatened to overwhelm them with filings. 
The Second Circuit responded to this crisis in a number of ways.  Like 
other courts, it confronted the termination issue by concluding that in 
reviewing eligibility for ongoing benefits, the SSA was required to apply a 
“medical improvement standard,” meaning that the agency’s prior finding 
of disability established a presumption of continued eligibility for benefits 
that could be overcome only by a showing that the recipient had 
“improved.”260  In dealing with denials of claims on new applications, the 
Second Circuit issued dozens of decisions in individual appeals upholding 
claimants’ rights to fair procedures in the administrative process.261  These 
decisions created a substantial jurisprudence that amounted to a common 
law of substantial evidence review.  The principal analytical tool that the 
circuit relied on was the treating physician rule announced in Gold and 
rooted in the Kerner decision.262  The Second Circuit consistently upheld 
the rights of claimants to bring class action litigation seeking injunctive 
relief to halt unlawful agency procedures.263  The individual cases 
 
 258. For example, District Judge Lee Sarokin referred to the SSA as “a heartless and 
indifferent bureaucratic monster destroying the lives of disabled citizens.” Merli v. Heckler, 
600 F. Supp. 249, 250 (D.N.J. 1984); see also City of New York v. Heckler, 578 F. Supp. 
1109 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Alfonso A. Narvaez, Judge Criticizes U.S. Agency on Denial of 
Benefits, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 1984), http://www.nytimes.com/1984/06/08/nyregion/judge-
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claims.html (recounting judicial criticisms of the SSA) [https://perma.cc/N36L-YHR5]. 
 259. See William Buzbee, Administrative Agency Intracircuit Nonacquiescence, 85 
COLUM. L. REV. 582 (1985); Carolyn A. Kubitschek, Social Security Administration 
Nonacquiescence:  The Need for Legislative Curbs on Agency Discretion, 50 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 399 (1989). 
 260. De Leon v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 734 F.2d 930, 936–37 (2d Cir. 1984).  
As the court pointed out in De Leon, this was in accord with rulings in eight other circuits. 
See id.  Congress adopted this standard in the Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984. See 
42 U.S.C. § 423(f) (2012). 
 261. See infra notes 268–70 and accompanying text. 
 262. See Gold v. Sec’y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 463 F.2d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 1972) (citing 
Kerner v. Flemming, 283 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1960)). 
 263. See New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1989), aff’g New York v. Bowen, 
690 F. Supp. 1261 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Dixon v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1102 (2d Cir. 1986), aff’g 
589 F. Supp. 1494 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), vacated sub nom. Bowen v. Dixon, 482 U.S. 922 
(1987); City of New York v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1984), aff’g 578 F. Supp. 1109 
(E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff’d sub nom. Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467 (1986).  In City 
of New York v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1984), the Second Circuit upheld Judge Jack 
Weinstein’s decision that the SSA could not rely on the statute of limitations because its 
policies were clandestine and could not reasonably be discovered by claimants. See id. at 
738.  This opened the door to sweeping class-wide relief that required the SSA to reopen 
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established standards that could be enforced through class action litigation.  
Class action litigation, in turn, protected the courts from being 
overwhelmed with individual cases repetitively raising the same issues.  
Finally, these two responses came together in two class actions:  Stieberger 
v. Bowen,264 (Stieberger II) challenging the agency’s policy of 
nonacquiesence in circuit court law,265 and Schisler v. Heckler266 (Schisler 
I), challenging the agency’s refusal to instruct its adjudicators in the Second 
Circuit’s treating physician rule in particular.267 
In reviewing individual appeals, the court repeatedly and emphatically 
stressed the importance of affording deference to claimants’ treating 
physicians and expressed heightened concerns about the agency’s apparent 
disregard for the principle.  For example, in Hidalgo v. Bowen,268 Judge 
Richard Cardamone reviewed the Second Circuit’s jurisprudence on the 
treating physician rule, concluding that, in the fifteen years since Gold, the 
court had seen the rule “consistently misapplied” by the SSA and that the 
number of published decisions on the subject overturning SSA 
determinations was “legion.”269  The court identified twenty-three cases and 
emphasized “how often the rule has been expounded,” and the court also 
indicated “some sense of frustration at how little, if any, impact our 
decisions have had on the Secretary and his administrative fact-finders.”270  
The Second Circuit’s jurisprudence in individual cases sent a clear message 
of skepticism and distrust of the SSA’s administrative processes. 
Given the SSA’s apparent pattern of lack of compliance with the treating 
physician rule, advocates for claimants turned their attention to seeking 
class-wide injunctive remedies.  In Schisler I, a class action on the standard 
to be applied in continuing disability eligibility reviews, the circuit 
confronted the SSA’s lawyers directly on this subject.271  At oral argument, 
the court attempted to extract a direct answer to the question of how the 
agency dealt with treating physician opinions at the administrative level.272  
Counsel reassured the court that the agency’s policy was “the same” as the 
Second Circuit’s rule, even if not articulated clearly.273  Despite the 
considerable evidence that, as Judge Ralph Winter put it, the “SSA does not 
 
thousands of denied claims.  The Supreme Court ultimately upheld this ruling in a 
unanimous decision. See Bowen, 476 U.S. at 478. 
 264. 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 265. See id. at 38. 
 266. 787 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding for the plaintiffs, a class of individuals whose 
benefits were terminated during a four-year period, and directing the SSA to draft a rule 
codifying the Second Circuit’s treating physician rule to be binding on all SSA factfinders); 
see also Schisler v. Bowen (Schisler II), 851 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1988) (upholding the court-
modified Social Security Ruling policy, which codified the Second Circuit’s treating 
physician rule); Schisler v. Sullivan (Schisler III), 3 F.3d 563 (2d Cir. 1993) (affirming the 
validity of the SSA’s own regulations regarding the treating physician rule). 
 267. See Schisler I, 787 F.2d at 84. 
 268. 822 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 269. Id. at 297. 
 270. Id. 
 271. See Schisler I, 787 F.2d at 83–84. 
 272. See id. 
 273. Id. 
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march to that particular drummer,” the court took the representations of 
counsel “at face value,” given counsel’s obligation of candor as an officer 
of the court.274  However, because of the record of reversals, the court 
directed that the SSA “state in relevant publications . . . that adjudicators at 
all levels, state and federal, are to apply the treating physician rule of this 
circuit.”275  Recognizing that this directive went far beyond the scope of the 
Schisler I class, the court noted, the “SSA can hardly object to this result in 
light of its representations to us as to what its policy is.”276  It continued, 
“all we order here is that [the] SSA tell its adjudicators what it has told us 
about the treating physician rule.”277 
Responding to the Second Circuit’s order directing the SSA to produce a 
publication for its adjudicators,278 the SSA submitted a twelve-page draft 
Social Security Ruling on treating physician evidence that the district court 
rejected as “fail[ing] to reflect, in significant respects, the treating physician 
rule recognized and effective here and to be in place nationwide.”279  The 
court found the draft to be “rambling and ambiguous” and noted “[t]here 
lurks in its lengthy and discursive texts bases for not applying the treating 
physician rule.”280  District Judge John Elfvin took out his red pen and 
edited the document himself to track Second Circuit decisions more closely.  
The Second Circuit affirmed on appeal, explaining that the purpose of the 
remand was to “mitigat[e] what had become an abuse of judicial processes 
resulting from [the] SSA’s adjudicators’ ignorance of the treating physician 
rule.”281  Accordingly, the court did not rule on the legality of the substance 
of the Secretary’s proposed instruction but held that the instruction was not 
the appropriate vehicle for developing or announcing new policy.282  Judge 
Winter wrote, “[h]aving taken the position that he has adopted the treating 
physician rule of this circuit, the Secretary is thereby bound to offer a 
formulation of that rule based on our caselaw.”283 
The Second Circuit’s handling of the treating physician issue in Schisler I 
was certainly extraordinary.  It hinged system-wide injunctive relief on 
counsel’s statements about agency policy at oral argument, rather than on 
analysis of the governing law and regulations, and created obligations for 
how evidence is to be weighed at the administrative level based on the 
court’s power of substantial evidence review.284  Moreover, the relief 
extended beyond the scope of the class certified in the case.  This unusual 
treatment reflected the fact that the system was in crisis—the agency’s 
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sharp change in course flooded the courts with individual cases, many of 
which presented compelling cases of hardship and threatened to leave the 
federal courts, as District Judge Morris E. Lasker put it, like “Cuchulain 
battling the invulnerable tide,” futilely trying to check the SSA one case at a 
time.285 
The Second Circuit’s remarkable response also reflected the difficulty the 
courts faced in fixing the problem.  While there were specific SSA policy 
statements that could be and were subject to challenge, much of the crisis 
resulted from a shift in the adjudicative culture at the agency, as its 
leadership pressured adjudicators to tighten standards.286  Indeed, the SSA’s 
own administrative law judges rose up in protest and sued the agency for 
exerting undue pressure on their decisional processes.287  The problem is 
compounded by the SSA’s passive-aggressive approach of refusing to adopt 
circuit court standards in its administrative adjudications, coupled with its 
failure to seek review for those standards by the Supreme Court.  While the 
Second Circuit’s approach in the Schisler decisions was therefore 
unorthodox, it represented a creative response to an unfolding disaster by a 
frustrated court. 
Like Schisler, Stieberger v. Heckler288 (Stieberger I) represented another 
attempt to close the gap between the Second Circuit’s approach to disability 
benefit eligibility and the Reagan administration’s practices.289  This class 
action challenged the SSA’s practice of nonacquiesence in decisions of the 
Second Circuit generally and arose, in part, from public assertions by 
Justice Department and SSA officials that agencies are not bound to follow 
the holdings of the courts of appeals beyond implementing specific 
orders.290  Under this view, when a circuit court reversed the SSA, the 
individual claimant received the benefit of the ruling, but the court’s 
reasoning would not be incorporated into the process of deciding similar 
claims.  The fascinating constitutional questions raised by administrative 
nonacquiescence lie beyond the scope of this Article,291 but the issue of 
nonacquiesence is an important part of this story. 
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The SSA’s statements about nonacquiescence were understood by lower 
court judges as a statement that the SSA would ignore their decisions and 
that it did not care whether its determinations accorded with circuit court 
standards.292  This remarkable affront to the judiciary put Assistant U.S. 
Attorneys in an untenable position, and U.S. Attorney Rudolph Giuliani 
wrote to the judges in the Southern District of New York assuring them that 
his office would not defend cases that did not meet judicial standards.293 
The SSA responded to the Stieberger class action by arguing, in the 
alternative, that its policies did not conflict with any Second Circuit 
decisions on the issue of disability, and thus it had not engaged in 
nonacquiescence to any decisions of the court.294  But even if it had, the 
agency argued, nonacquiescence was a perfectly lawful means of 
maintaining the national uniformity of the disability benefit programs.295  In 
ruling on plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction in the initial suit 
brought by the class in Stieberger I, District Court Judge Leonard Sand 
rejected both of these contentions, finding that the SSA’s lack of 
compliance with the treating physician rule was evident and that 
nonacquiescence violates basic principles of judicial review dating back to 
Marbury v. Madison.296  On appeal from this decision, the Second Circuit 
vacated the preliminary injunction in light of the relief ordered just a few 
years earlier in the Schisler I decision.297  While Judge Jon Newman 
recognized that the district court might ultimately find nonacquiescence in 
other holdings of the circuit and that injunctive relief may still be 
appropriate, the Schisler I decision spoke to the irreparable harm caused by 
the agency’s failure to follow the treating physician rule.298 
On remand from the Second Circuit’s decision in Stieberger v. Bowen299 
(Stieberger II), Judge Sand ultimately found that the SSA had engaged in 
nonacquiescence in at least two areas of Second Circuit law—the treating 
physician rule and the standards for dealing with “post-hearing 
evidence.”300  In reaching these conclusions, Judge Sand rejected the 
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argument that the SSA was only required to address circuit court law at the 
administrative level when the court’s holding was squarely inconsistent 
with agency policy.301  Instead, Judge Sand recognized that court decisions 
may add to, or elaborate on, policies and that these holdings are binding on 
the agency.302 
By the time of Judge Sand’s second ruling in Stieberger v. Sullivan303 
(Stieberger III), the SSA had been in retreat for a number of years.  With 
the end of the Reagan administration and President Bush’s emphasis on a 
kinder and gentler nation,304 the SSA was outwardly looking to mend 
fences with the courts and to put the legacy of the Reagan years behind 
it.305  In 1992, the SSA agreed to settle Stieberger by issuing a manual of 
Second Circuit case law on disability to be distributed to all adjudicators 
responsible for cases within the circuit.306 
The Stieberger settlement marked the close of a decade of remarkable 
acrimony and conflict between the Second Circuit and the SSA.  The 
cleanup continued for years afterward as injunctions and settlements in 
class actions required the agency to basically readjudicate a decade’s worth 
of benefit denials.307  The SSA came to terms with the treating physician 
rule by issuing a set of comprehensive regulations on the evaluation of 
medical evidence, thus putting an end to the game of cat and mouse around 
the issue of what exactly is the agency’s policy.308  The interlude 
demonstrates the ability of federal courts to act as an effective check on 
agencies not simply by exercising judicial review of an individual agency 
action, but by responding to a massive shift in administrative direction 
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implemented through both formal and informal means that transformed the 
administration of an entire program.  While courts across the country were 
involved in producing this result, no circuit was more engaged than the 
Second Circuit, evidenced by the stream of decisions involving panels 
consisting of members of the entire court, with key decisions written by 
many members of the court.309  This leadership should not be surprising, 
given the groundbreaking framework established by Second Circuit in 
Kerner at the outset of the disability benefit programs. 
Social Security disability cases are justice at the retail level.  They are 
fact intensive and technical, and generally do not raise the kinds of legal 
issues and analysis that attract most able attorneys to the federal bench.310  
Moreover, the principle of judicial deference to administrative agencies 
easily could lead courts to apply only a light touch to judicial review.  
Nonetheless, these cases are critical to people in need.  They are important 
to people’s lives.  The Second Circuit has long recognized this reality, 
rolled up its sleeves, and dug into the record in ways that have had a major 
impact. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we attempted to illustrate a variety of issues through 
which the Second Circuit has advanced social justice.  This diversity, 
reflective of the rich legal and social communities in which the Second 
Circuit sits, is in itself a strength.  But the deeper significance of the Second 
Circuit’s jurisprudence is its nuance and sensitivity to fundamental power 
inequality, illustrated by the case law discussed herein.  In 1951, Chief 
Judge Learned Hand captured the Second Circuit’s tradition with brevity 
and eloquence:  “If we are to keep our democracy, there must be one 
commandment:  Thou shalt not ration justice.”311  We look forward to the 
circuit continuing to break new ground as it dispenses justice in its 
considered and thoughtful fashion. 
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